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Since their beginnings in 1913, the twelve regional 
Federal Reserve Banks have been authorized to lend 
money to member banks at an interest rate set by the 
Federal Reserve System: the discount rate. The Fed's 
loans to member banks have been justified by policy-
makers on two grounds. One justification is that such 
loans are needed in the event of national banking 
emergencies — circumstances that place the Fed in the 
position of "lender of last resort." The prime example 
of the Fed meeting such an emergency is the financial 
turmoil in the late 1920s and early 1930s, when many 
member banks used loans from the Fed's discount 
window to help them adjust to the financial pressures 
of that period. 
The other justification given by policymakers for 
Fed loans to member banks is that money markets do 
not efficiently or adequately meet the recurring re-
quirements banks have for funds in their day-to-day 
operations. This justification was enunciated in a 1971 
report of a Federal Reserve System committee ap-
pointed to appraise the Fed's lending function: 
Distributive mechanisms [for money] among both 
economic and geographic sectors in the United 
States are often imperfect and in some cases 
clearly inadequate. This results in problems of 
[money] distribution which the Federal Reserve 
can compensate for only through a technique such 
as discounting [lending through its discount win-
dow]. The window can meet the temporary needs 
of particular banks directly as they arise, without 
waiting for the sometimes sluggish distributive 
mechanisms to carry credit injected into the cen-
tral money market to the point of actual need.
1 
Before 1973, the conditions for borrowing from 
the Fed based on this market-failure rationale were 
limited. Banks were permitted to borrow from the Fed 
in response to unexpected fluctuations in deposits and 
loan demand. However, the amount any one bank 
could borrow, the length of each borrowing period, and 
the frequency with which such loans could be obtained 
were closely monitored by Fed officials. Moreover, 
the Fed discouraged frequent borrowing by subjecting 
borrowing banks to disciplinary contacts by discount 
officers. 
The market-failure rationale underlying Fed lend-
ing to member banks became much more significant in 
1973 with the establishment of the seasonal borrow-
ing privilege. The stated purpose of the new privilege 
was to make funds available to member banks that 
"lack reasonably reliable access to national money 
markets."
2 The privilege was designed primarily to 
provide funds to small rural banks—the banks that, in 
the view of policymakers, are adversely affected by 
market failure — during regularly recurring periods of 
heavy loan demand, such as the crop planting and 
growing seasons. Because of the large number of small 
1 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Reappraisal of the 
Federal Reserve discount mechanism, 1971, p. 6. 
2Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve 
Bulletin, April 1973, p. 314. Some people contend that the underlying 
motivation for the seasonal borrowing privilege was to make membership more 
attractive to small rural banks. Membership will only be made more attractive, 
however, if there is a subsidy to the appropriate banks or if the seasonal 
borrowing privilege offsets a market failure. We do not consider the subsidy 
issue here because subsidizing small rural banks has never been the explicit 
purpose for the seasonal borrowing privilege. Thus it is difficult to evaluate 
whether or not the Federal Reserve has achieved its goal. 
The evidence does seem to show, however, that the privilege has not 
been used much in this way or that, if it has, it has failed. Presumably, small 
banks would be more likely to desire membership if they could be guaranteed a 
subsidy of a given size. While there has been a subsidy, it has varied over time 
and among banks. The discount rate has fluctuated above and below the 
market rates; and when it has been below market rates, mostly large banks, not 
small ones, have taken advantage of the privilege. 
9 rural member banks and the long borrowing periods 
permitted, the seasonal borrowing privilege has greatly 
expanded the potential use of the Fed's discount 
window. 
There are those who believe, however, that the 
market-failure rationale is an unsupported hypothesis, 
and so they question the value of the seasonal borrow-
ing privilege. To be sure, the efficiency and adequacy 
of the money market in providing funds to small rural 
banks is inhibited by the presence of government 
regulations. For example, federal and state regulations 
prohibit banks and other financial depositories from 
paying market rates on most savings and time deposits 
when those rates exceed legal ceilings, and over the 
past 15 years these ceiling rates have often been below 
market rates. Nonetheless, some deposits and other 
types of bank liabilities are not subject to interest rate 
ceilings, and banks do find ways to obtain these funds. 
The purpose of this study was to test the market-
failure hypothesis by evaluating the use of the seasonal 
borrowing privilege. Much of the evidence has been 
drawn from use of the seasonal borrowing privilege at 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis from 1973 
to 1978. Because of its rural orientation, the Ninth 
District
3 contains the highest proportion of banks 
eligible to use the privilege of any district in the 
Federal Reserve System. 
The findings of the study do not support the 
market-failure hypothesis. First, banks eligible for the 
seasonal borrowing privilege have made little use of it. 
And second, most of those banks that have used the 
privilege are clearly banks that could have obtained 
funds from the money markets but chose to use the 
privilege when the discount rate was below market 
rates. 
The seasonal borrowing experience so far sug-
gests, therefore, that this Federal Reserve policy is not 
justified as a market-failure remedy: there simply is no 
evidence that the market has failed. However, the 
privilege is still fairly new, and some transitory factors 
may have prevented the banks it was meant to help 
from using it. So the Fed may want to continue this 
privilege until we have more conclusive evidence. 
Seasonal loans should only be available at market 
rates, though, so that, as intended, the privilege would 
only be used by banks who have no other choice. 
Rationale for the Seasonal Borrowing Privilege 
Rural banks experience seasonal fluctuations in loans 
and deposits because they generally serve one-industry 
towns, and those industries often have a pronounced 
seasonal pattern of expenditures and incomes. The 
most common single industry in rural communities is, 
of course, agriculture. In communities where agricul-
ture is the dominant industry, funds at banks decline in 
the spring and summer as farmers withdraw deposits 
and take out loans to buy seed and fertilizer and to 
provide for their operating and living expenses. In the 
fall and winter, the funds flow is reversed as farmers 
build up their savings and pay off loans with the 
proceeds from the harvest. Thus banks that serve 
agricultural communities may need funds from outside 
their areas for as long as six or nine months to offset the 
seasonal dip in local funds. 
Before the seasonal borrowing privilege became 
available, rural banks typically financed this seasonal 
dip by selling liquid assets such as U.S. Treasury bills 
or other short-term securities in the spring and summer 
and buying them again in the fall when funds flowed 
back. But this source of funds has diminished steadily 
since World War II when policies aimed at shifting the 
nation's resources to the war effort promoted a high 
ratio of government securities relative to loans at rural 
banks. In 1945 the ratio of securities to total assets of 
small member banks in the U.S. stood at 63.5 percent, 
but by 1972, the year before the privilege became 
effective, it had declined to 30.6 percent (see chart). 
This decline was due to an increase in the demand for, 
and in the profitability of, bank loans. The stronger 
demand for loans at rural banks reflected both the 
burgeoning agricultural credit requirements as that 
industry became more mechanized and the increasing 
capital needs of small industrial firms relocating in 
rural areas to capture their lower wage rates. 
The continuing decline in the share of liquid assets 
in bank portfolios concerned policymakers.
4 They 
feared that the proportion of liquid assets in the 
portfolios of rural banks would soon reach the lower 
bound dictated by regulations, contracts, and prudent 
managerial requirements and that at that point, if not 
sooner, banks would not make new funds available for 
loans. Without governmental involvement, banks 
would be forced to ration loans, even though borrowers 
3The Ninth Federal Reserve District includes Minnesota, Montana, 
North and South Dakota, northwestern Wisconsin, and the Upper Peninsula 
of Michigan. 
4Reappraisal, pp. 15-16. 
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were willing to pay market rates of interest. Since 
banks are the major financial institutions in many rural 
communities, such action would hurt those communi-
ties. 
Crucial to the policymakers' fears that the time 
would come when loans would not be available is the 
assumption that rural banks could not easily obtain 
funds from the money market.
5 There are three main 
reasons for this assumption. First, policymakers con-
tended that rural banks are too small to compete 
directly in the national money market.
6 The two princi-
pal regulation-free markets banks have for obtaining 
funds are those for Federal funds and large certificates 
of deposit. Transactions in both instruments, they 
claimed, are conducted in denominations beyond the 
capacity or desire of small banks to undertake. The 
risk for lenders, many believe, is too great at these 
levels because rural banks don't have sufficient capital 
and government deposit insurance is inadequate. More-
over, there may not be enough loan demand to 
absorb the amount of funds borrowed. 
Second, policymakers argued that although small 
banks could get smaller amounts from correspondent 
banks, the correspondent banking system is not a 
reliable provider of seasonal funds.
7 A large corre-
spondent bank is capable of acting as an intermediary 
between small rural banks and the national money 
market. It can do this by lending funds obtained from 
the money market directly to its rural respondent 
banks or by using these funds to buy participations in 
loans originated by these banks. But policymakers 
argued that the correspondent system doesn't always 
work this way. Correspondent banks only lend to their 
rural respondent banks from excess funds on hand. As 
long as interest rates are low and their own loan 
demand is weak, correspondent banks are willing to 
provide funds to their rural bank respondents. When 
interest rates rise and their loan demand from nonbank 
customers strengthens, however, correspondent banks 
seek to fill the needs of their nonbank customers first 
and thus are not reliable sources of funds for small 
rural banks. 
Third, policymakers contended that the money 
market doesn't work well in rural areas because 
government regulations designed to attain other policy 
goals shut off access to outside funds by restricting the 
freedom of rural banks to join multioffice banking 
organizations.
8 A bank with branches or a multibank 
holding company can do for its individual branch 
offices or bank affiliates what the capital market does 
for independent firms — shift funds from areas of low 
loan demand to areas of high demand. If the desired 
funds cannot be obtained by shifting funds between 
offices, the parent organization is likely to be large 
enough to obtain funds in the money market directly. 
However, in many states where small rural banks 
predominate, regulations prohibit branching; and al-
though some of these states permit rural banks to join 
bank holding companies, regulators have often pre-
vented such mergers out of fear that bank competition 
will diminish. 
The belief that small rural banks would therefore 
at some time be unable to obtain funds with which to 
fill customer loan demand led the Federal Reserve to 
5Reappraisal, p. 15. 
6Reappraisal, p. 54. 
7Reappraisal, pp. 61-62. 
8Reappraisal, p. 62. 
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How the Privilege Is Administered 
The Federal Reserve makes the seasonal borrowing 
privilege available to all of its member banks that 
demonstrate a substantial seasonal dip in funds avail-
able for making loans. A seasonal dip in funds is 
defined as a decline in net fund availability — deposits 
minus loans — that recurs at about the same time each 
year and that lasts for at least one month. The amount 
of seasonal credit that a bank can get from the Fed 
during this period is limited to the amount by which the 
seasonal dip in funds exceeds a specified proportion of 
its deposits. The proportion is progressive, starting 
with 4 percent on the first $100 million of deposits and 
rising to 10 percent on deposits of more than $200 
million. The maximum term of the seasonal loan is not 
specified in the regulations, but in practice it may run 
as long as nine months. 
As policymakers intended, the main beneficiaries 
of these eligibility requirements are the small rural 
banks, the banks that were thought to be cut off from 
the money market. In 1976, when the most recent 
revision in the seasonal borrowing privilege was made, 
47 percent of all U.S. member banks appeared to be 
eligible to borrow under the privilege. Eligibility was 
relatively high for small banks, as 52 percent of banks 
with deposits under $25 million qualified compared to 
only 22 percent of banks with deposits over $250 
million. Eligibility was also relatively high for rural 
banks, as 62 percent of banks with farm loans compris-
ing at least one-fourth of all their loans qualified for the 
seasonal borrowing privilege compared to 40 percent 
of banks with farm loans accounting for less than one-
twentieth of their loans. Although many banks are 
eligible, the credit available for each bank is small, on 
average. In 1976 the estimated maximum amount that 
all eligible banks could borrow under the seasonal 
borrowing privilege was $736 million on a daily 
average basis, representing only 1.4 percent of total 
loans at all eligible banks. 
No Support for the Market-Failure Hypothesis 
That financial markets are unavailable to rural banks 
is not evident from the use they have made of the 
seasonal borrowing privilege since 1973. 
In the first place, they have not used the privilege 
very much. Nationally, annual participation in the first 
five years the seasonal borrowing privilege was in 
effect never exceeded 18 percent of eligible banks. The 
dollar volume of seasonal borrowing also remained 
small compared to what could have been borrowed. In 
1978, for example, annual average borrowing totaled 
$121 million—only 17 percent of the funds available. 
The small proportion of eligible banks that have 
used the privilege suggests at the very least that the 
market failure was less extensive than policymakers 
believed. And so does the fact that usage has not grown 
steadily. Increased use could have been expected 
because the proportion of liquid assets in portfolios of 
the nation's rural banks has declined since the privilege 
went into effect. Between 1972 and 1978, the ratio of 
securities to total assets for small member banks 
declined from 30.6 percent to 26.8 percent. But the 
proportion of eligible banks that borrowed under the 
privilege, instead of rising, declined from 18 percent in 
1974 to 15 percent in 1978. 
Secondly, most banks that have borrowed under 
the seasonal borrowing privilege seem to have done so 
not because they had to but because the discount rate 
was below market rates. 
Based on the arguments that policymakers have 
used to justify the privilege, banks that have borrowed 
under it could be expected to be small and independent. 
They would be small because the national money 
market only deals in large denomination instruments 
that are out of the direct reach of small banks. They 
would be independent—that is, not branch banks or 
affiliates of multibank holding companies — because 
otherwise they could obtain funds either from other 
offices or from the money market through the holding 
company itself. They would not be able to rely on a 
correspondent bank because when interest rates rise, 
correspondent banks choose to allocate funds to their 
nonbank customers first. 
Evidence about the characteristics and behavior 
of banks that have actually borrowed under the sea-
sonal borrowing privilege is based on an examination 
of member banks in the Ninth District that borrowed 
between 1973 and 1978. An analysis of this district is 
appropriate because it contains a large number of 
eligible and borrowing banks. About 70 percent of 
Ninth District member banks—about 375 banks al-
together— are eligible for the privilege, a higher pro-
portion than in any other district and much more than 
the 46 percent national average. But as in the nation, 
the proportion of Ninth District eligible banks that 
12  Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review/Fall 1979 Table 1 
Banks using the seasonal borrowing privilege 
have tended to be large. 
Size Distribution of Ninth District Banks 
Deposit Size as of June 1978 
Less than $10 to $25 to $50 mil. 
Bank Category $10 mil. 25 mil. 50 mil. and over 
All FRS members  23%  37%  22%  18% 
Eligible seasonal 
borrowers (1973-78)  23  38  23  16 
Seasonal borrowers 
(1973-78)  11  25  33  31 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
have borrowed has remained small and even declined 
— from 19 percent in 1974 to 11 percent in 1978. 
Altogether, about 75 banks used the seasonal borrow-
ing privilege at some time during the six years. 
But most of these banks were not the ones for 
which the seasonal borrowing privilege was intended. 
They were neither small nor independent. 
Indeed, Ninth District banks that borrowed under 
the seasonal privilege tended to be relatively large (see 
Table 1). Only 16 percent of the eligible banks had 
deposits of $50 million or more, but 31 percent of the 
banks that borrowed were this large. On the other end 
of the size spectrum, banks with deposits of less than 
$10 million accounted for 23 percent of eligible banks 
but only 11 percent of seasonal borrowers. In short, a 
disproportionate number of large banks borrowed 
under the privilege, while a disproportionate number of 
small banks seemed to get along without it. 
Furthermore, in this district borrowing banks 
tended to be affiliated with multibank holding com-
panies. Of the banks eligible for seasonal borrowing, 
30 percent were multibank holding company affiliates, 
but among borrowing banks 55 percent were affiliates. 
Only 13 percent of the eligible independent banks took 
advantage of the privilege. 
The Ninth District banks that borrowed from the 
Fed under the seasonal privilege also frequently bor-
rowed from other banks even when market rates were 
Table 2 
Banks using the seasonal privilege 
have often borrowed from other banks, 
even at high interest rates. 
Average Number of Weeks 
in Which Ninth District 
Seasonal Borrowers Fed 
Year Borrowed Fed Funds Funds Rate 
1974 51% 10.51% 
1975 51 5.82 
1976 56 5.05 
1977 54 5.54 
1978 61 7.94 
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
high (see Table 2). From 1974 to 1978, seasonal 
borrowing banks, on average, borrowed Federal funds 
in more than half the weeks of each year; less than 5 
percent never borrowed Federal funds during that 
period. Further, the frequency of Federal funds bor-
rowing was not materially affected by high interest 
rates. In 1974, when the funds rate averaged 10.5 
percent, Federal funds were borrowed just about as 
13 often as in 1975 and 1976, when the rate averaged 5.8 
percent and 5.1 percent, respectively. And between 
1977 and 1978, the frequency of Federal funds bor-
rowing actually increased, even though the average 
interest rate rose from 5.5 to 7.9 percent. All this is 
strong evidence that the banks that used the privilege 
were able and willing to borrow at other banks; they 
did have access to money markets. 
Why did they use the Fed's seasonal borrowing 
privilege, then? The evidence suggests that most banks 
used it not because market sources were not readily 
available, but mainly because the Fed offered the 
lower rates. Changes in the number of district banks 
using the seasonal borrowing privilege have been 
closely correlated with changes in the difference be-
tween the Federal funds rate and the discount rate (see 
Table 3). When that difference widened, as in 1978, 
more banks borrowed at the discount window. When it 
shrank, and even became negative as in 1975-77, the 
number of seasonal borrowers shrank too. 
Conclusion 
The experience with the seasonal borrowing privilege 
does not support the market-failure hypothesis. We 
find no evidence that small rural banks, for whom the 
privilege was intended, have been systematically ex-
cluded from money markets. Moreover, most banks 
that have used the privilege fall into categories for 
which the question of access to money markets must 
be rejected out of hand. 
The evidence, however, is not conclusive. The 
small proportion of banks that have borrowed under 
the privilege and the lack of an upward trend seemingly 
reject the market-failure hypothesis. But there may be 
other reasons why banks without access to the money 
markets have not borrowed from the Fed. Policy-
makers could have overestimated the point at which 
banks would stop reducing liquid assets in order to 
provide loan funds for their customers. Moreover, 
banks might view the privilege as an assured line of 
credit, thus enabling them to continue reducing liquid 
assets until legal limits prohibit further liquidation. 
And, possibly, bankers may not have had enough time 
to adjust to the Fed's less restrictive administration of 
the discount window. 
Thus, even though the seasonal borrowing privi-
lege cannot now be justified as a market-failure remedy, 
perhaps the policy should be continued for a time. If 
it is to be continued, however, the privilege should only 
be available at the market rate. This would ensure that 
the privilege is not used simply because it is cheaper. 
Any use then would more likely be evidence that the 
market really has failed. 
Table 3 
Seasonal borrowing has been closely related to 
the spread between the Fed funds rate 
and the discount rate. 
Number of Fed Funds Rate 
Ninth District Minus Discount Rate 
Year Seasonal Borrowers (basis points) 
1974 48 268 
1975 15 -42 
1976 11 -45 
1977 14 7 
1978 40 47 
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
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